Fightin’ Food

by

Lauren Roberts

               

Bread is not only the staff of life, it’s the foundation of war. I am not referring to the fact that wars are fought over food, but that they cannot be fought without a steady supply of it. Both the military and civilians (plus any prisoners of war) must be ensured a steady supply of good food. This is certainly not a new idea, but it was one that occupied a vast amount of time, energy and government resources in World War II.

During this war and during all previous ones in which the U.S. was involved there was no Department of Defense. There was no military-industrial complex that existed in peacetime. When war came, it meant that all industries, government departments and citizens turned their efforts from societal interests to war needs. And when America became involved in the Second World War, food immediately became one of the government’s largest concerns.

Gerald W. Thomas, in “Food Will Win the War—And Shape the Peace that Follows,” noted: “Major wars have always had a significant impact on agriculture. Even though a country at peace may be in a period of apparent surplus production, the outbreak of war produces food problems of immediate international concern. The experiences of World War II were similar. There are several reasons for the sudden development of deficiencies during war periods. More food is needed to insure that our troops and our Allies have the needed reserves. Food is tied up in transportation and storage. Additional processing is required to prepare balanced rations that will not spoil or deteriorate under battle conditions. Men are moved from the farm and associated industry to supply the war machine. All of these factors place pressure on agricultural resources and emphasize the need for food reserves during wartime.”

When the U.S. officially entered the war, food needs increased even more. It became quickly obvious that the volunteer approaches—the “meatless” and “wheatless” days—used during World War I were inadequate to the developing situation. In the spring of 1942, the Food Rationing Program was set into motion. And when on April 19, 1943, the War Food Administration (WFA) entered the picture food became an official part of the war machine.

Expanding military requirements had contributed substantially to developing food shortages in 1942. Late that year, it was obvious that military plans for 1943 would require an army of 8.2 million and a navy of approximately 1.8 million men who would consume enormous quantities of food. Another heavy drain on our food supplies came from the necessity of keeping our allies, chiefly Great Britain and Russia, in the war. And with the invasion of North Africa in late 1942 brought with it the problem of food for liberated peoples. “Food is as important as any other weapon in the successful prosecution of the war. It will be equally important in rehabilitation and relief in the liberated areas, and in shaping the peace that is to come,” declared Roosevelt on October 31, 1943.

   

The growing shortages of meat, fats, and oils, dairy products and canned foods at home meant that current policies had become inadequate. War was on our doorstep. And like  steel, copper, manpower, manufacturing facilities, and other strategic resources, food needed specific mobilization policies to ensure that all needs could be met. Based on these facts, the responsibilities of the Secretary of Agriculture were increased and the department reorganized. The Secretary was solely responsible for determining the supplies of food for civilians and for allocating said supplies, while the Price Administrator had responsibility for developing rationing programs and techniques.

War-essential crops took precedence, and farmers had to be persuaded to use their land for them. Produce had to be effectively and efficiently channeled  to processors, wholesalers and retailers. The overseeing government agencies had to coordinate the needs of the three classes of users as well as those of related agencies.  

By late March 1943, several agencies—Food Production Administration, Food Distribution Administration, Commodity Credit Corporation and Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture—had been placed under what was called the Administration of Food Production and Distribution. Then on April 19, the name of the agency was changed to the War Food Administration, and staff offices of the Department of Agriculture were answerable to both the Secretary of Agriculture and the War Food Administrator.

The December Food Order had directed the Secretary of Agriculture to “take all appropriate steps to insure the efficient and proper distribution of the available supply of food,” but it also noted that rationing programs at the retail and consumer levels would be carried out through the Office of Price Administration. The Secretary was expected to consult with the Price Administrator in regards to civilian rationing.

Disagreement between the two departments ensued, and it wasn’t until February 12, 1943, that an agreement was signed. The Department of Agriculture had exclusive “responsibility for determining supplies of foods available for civilian consumption and for allocating supplies accordingly,” and for determining the need for and time and extent of civilian rationing. The Office of Price Administration was given primary responsibility for developing the rationing programs, and for determining rationing techniques and procedures.

It was a convoluted, politically-charged undertaking for the War Food Administration department. Who would have responsibility for what went back and forth in a kaleidoscopic scene of priorities, egos, necessary secrecy and production possibilities. But the fact was that complete authority for food management could not be concentrated in a single agency because solutions devised for food problems would have a profound effect on matters that could not be handled by a civilian agency.

 “The United States at War,” a report by the Committee on Records of War Administration, noted that “it was necessary to determine which commodities were most essential to conduct of the war; to persuade millions of farmers to plant essential war corps and to take risks involved in shifting to new crops; to balance the need for imported foodstuffs against requirements for manganese and chrome and to assign shipping space accordingly; to divide the nation’s labor force among farms, factories, and the military services; to decide whether plants should continue to make farm machinery and food processing equipment or convert to production of tanks and guns; and to decide whether chemicals should be used to manufacture anti-typhus and anti-malaria insecticides or refrigerants for food storage facilities. In controlling food distribution, provision had to be made for equalizing supplies between the country's producing and consuming areas; procuring food for military services without disruption of local markets and in accordance with seasonal fluctuations of supply; and for moving raw foodstuffs to processors so that luxury commodities were not produced at the expense of necessities or supplies of processed foods were not taken out of the ordinary trade channels.”

Determining military and foreign food requirements involved substantial problems. The logistical details of supply planning for millions of men in varying locations—the North Atlantic, the South Pacific, the North African desert, the continent of Europe—as well as seasonal fluctuations in supply, availability of shipping, refrigeration and storage space, and food preferences of the men were all important considerations. Additionally, manpower strength, distribution and strategy were not shared outside of a tiny need-to-know group that did not include those responsible for estimating food requirements.

Decision about foreign requirements was also made outside the agency responsible for estimating them, and it was known that military and diplomatic considerations at the highest levels were the primary factors in determining how much and where supplies went. Not surprisingly, civilian needs were seen as residuum, an issue that remained after the more pressing needs had been met.

So it became necessary to get people involved not only in government efforts but in their own food production. Individual efforts evolved into clubs, organizations and communities coming to terms with the immediate circumstances.

As soon as the war was declared, the 4-H Club program was like everything else revised to meet the changing situation through special agricultural projects. “Food For Freedom” Clubs were organized, and the slogan “4-H Clubs Help Win The War” was adopted.

Manpower shortages in the fields were addressed by women, prisoners-of-war and Mexican laborers. By 1943 the federal government finally had broken through its bureaucratic  infighting to produce a number of programs designed to help farmers. The WFA gave  them twelve labor “short cuts” that included pooling machinery with  neighboring farmers, getting portable fencing, cutting  unnecessary steps in farm chores and using labor-saving devices. But the biggest help came in the form of workers. The Geneva Convention allows prisoners-of-war to be used in agriculture and food production if it is “clearly understood that prisoner-of-war labor is considered emergency labor and as such, cannot be used until all local sources of free labor have been exhausted.” The program was so successful that the scheduled repatriation of about fourteen thousand prisoners in 1946 was actually postponed at the request of the Secretary of Agriculture so that prisoners could be used on essential farm work.

                    

The creation of the U.S. Crop Corps and its separate units, the Women’s Land Corps and the Victory Farm Volunteers, also provided much needed relief. The Women’s Land Army started up operations in 1943. Most of the women were employed on a “day-haul” basis meaning that they were given rides to the fields in school buses, farmers'  trucks or personal cars. They picked fruit, hoed, weeded  or harvested vegetables, and helped with canning and processing food. Some did household work at the farm house, thus freeing up the often more experienced “womenfolk of the farm” to drive tractors and other skilled work. Those who worked all year often received special training for dairy farm jobs and other ongoing farm jobs.

Rationing was an essential part of the homefront war efforts; it worked by regulating the amount of commodities that consumers could obtain. Sugar rationing took effect in May 1943 with the distribution of “Sugar Buying Cards.” Coupons were distributed based on family size, and the coupon book allowed the holder to buy a specified amount. But possession of a coupon book did not guarantee that sugar would be available. “Red Stamp” rationing covered all meats, butter, fat and oils and, with some exceptions, cheese. Each person was allowed a certain amount of points weekly with expiration dates to consider. “Blue Stamp” rationing covered canned, bottled and frozen fruits and vegetables, plus juices and dry beans as well as processed foods (soups, baby food and catsup). Ration stamps became a kind of currency with each family being issued a “War Ration Book.” Each stamp authorized a purchase of rationed goods in the quantity and time designated, and the book guaranteed each family its fair share of increasingly scarce goods.

               

Training sessions were held to teach women to shop wisely, conserve food, plan nutritious meals and to can. The government also printed a monthly meal-planning guide with recipes and a daily menu. Good Housekeeping printed a special section for rationed foods in its 1943 cookbook.

To help with rationing, the government promoted “Victory Gardens.” The term dates back to 1603 when Richard Gardner, in a book entitled Victory Garden declared that “if any citie or towne should be besieged with the enemy, what better provision for the greatest number of people can be than every garden to be sufficiently planted with carrots?”  

A booklet prepared by the War Ad Council around 1944 entitled “Make Food Fight for Freedom by Eating Wisely” encouraged this cooperation. Not to grow a garden or care for fruiting shrubs and trees was considered unpatriotic. To fail to preserve its bounty was downright un-American. “A Garden Will Make Your Rations Go Further” was one slogan, and some businesses even provided garden plots and soil preparation services to their employees.

                             

People responded enthusiastically. (By 1945 twenty million victory gardens had produced approximately 40 percent of America's vegetables.) Empty lots, school fields, former flower gardens and back yards were cultivated. For an investment of $1.30 for seeds and $1.50 for fertilizer (in 1940s prices), a full day’s preparatory work, and approximately eight hours of work per week the average family could enjoy four to five months’ worth of fresh vegetables.

Recycling was also essential. Among my books are two booklets: Victory Backyard Gardens: Simple Rules for Growing Your Own Vegetables published by Whitman Publishing Company of Racine, Wisconsin, and A Guide to Wartime Cooking by H. J. Heinz. Behind the title page of Victory Backyard Gardens is printed part of a speech by Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, which says in part: “Our national fate will be settled on the field of battle. But whether our brothers and sons and nephews and cousins who do the fighting are victorious depends on hard work by each of us in producing the essential goods for making war . . . Several months ago the free peoples of the world received new inspiration from the symbol of V for Victory. Let us make it the three V’s—Vegetables for Vitality for Victory.” Being strong and healthy civilians was also important to the war campaign as can be seen in the bookmark.

A Guide to Wartime Cooking begins with this: “We know you women have a big job running your homes today . . . But your biggest job, the job all women must face alike these days, is managing the food supply: shopping under the point ration program . .  . using substitutes when essential foods are scarce . . . planning meals your family will still thrive on . . . packing a lunch pail that will keep your man strong and healthy, wide awake on his job.” An entire section is devoted to planning the lunch box meal and other details, but the most fascinating part is the back page. “Join the salvage program today” it declares, and tells the reader that “two pounds of waste fat will make enough glycerine for five anti-tank shells.”   

Not surprisingly, food manufacturers took advantage of wartime shortages to increase their profits on the back of patriotism. Swift & Company proclaimed in its ads for Treet (similar to Spam) that “Meat is the material of war!” Stokely's proudly announced: “It takes food to win a war . . . and Uncle Sam's fighting men are the best fed in the world. We are proud to report that some part of every crop of Stokely's vegetables and fruits is being sent to the Allied Forces.”

Grocers weren’t immune from a little flag-waving of their own. An ad for Kroger, a grocery store chain, cautioned, “Don’t waste your meat ration! Be sure! Be safe at Kroger's.” That same ad also provided lists of food items and the points needed to purchase them.

The success of these and similar programs was the focus for a provocative essay, “Propaganda’s Fools,” by Karen De Coster in 2002, in which she takes note of the necessity of prodding the entire nation, through programs, posters and community pressure, into a frenzy of patriotism. “Every act of state propaganda requires a cause to make it necessary,” she writes. “That cause needs a catchy theme that conveys how one should think about it . . . Each cause, therefore, requires a crisis—or a perceived crisis—in order for the masses to more readily accept the symbolism disseminated in the name of that cause . . . what could be more fear-provoking than the crisis of war?

“The feel-good propaganda, in particular, played upon the natural inclination people have toward participation and accomplishment, and it boasted of individuals playing their proper role in the war effort . . . A smiling housewife boasting about her family’s food rationing was intended to provoke a general submissiveness on the part of families toward government diktat . . . Other good behavior included abiding by price controls and believing in the ultimate value of such, and certainly, avoiding black markets to serve one’s daily needs. A good American would rather ‘do without it’ was the message. And the offices of War Information, Price Administration, and War Food Administration were adept at conveying that meaning.”

After the German surrender in May and the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the government moved swiftly to relax the remaining ration controls. Sugar was the last item to be removed, and that took only a few more months. Americans emerged from the war among the best fed of all Allied nations—and so we have been ever since. The WFA ceased to exist on June 29, 1945 when its authority and responsibility was transferred back to the Secretary of Agriculture; the changes became permanent on July 16, 1946. All wars fought since that time have been pretty much pain-free for the civilian populace who no longer are asked to sacrifice for the “war effort.” Instead we eat our fill, buy our toys and spend our days in blissful pursuit of pleasure. The military lives on a bloated budget that uses our taxes, but it no longer requires our contributions.

On this, Memorial Day 2007, I want to urge BiblioBuffet’s readers to consider if a war that has become so distant from our lives that it requires nothing from us—no food sacrifices, no salvage materials, not even consideration as to whether it is worth fighting—is a war worth fighting. I firmly and strongly believe it is not.  

Bookmark specifications: War Food Administration
Dimensions: 7 1/2" x  2 1/4"
Material: Heavyweight paper
Manufacturer: War Food Administration, U.S. Government
Date: 1943-1945
Acquired: eBay


Almost since her childhood days of Mother Goose, Lauren has been giving her opinion on books to anyone who will listen. That “talent” eventually took her out of magazine writing and into book reviewing in 2000 for an online review site where she cut her teeth (as well as a few authors). Stints as book editor for her local newspaper and contributing editor to Booklist and Bookmarks magazines has reinforced her belief that she has interesting things to say about books. Lauren shares her home with several significant others including three cats, 800 bookmarks and approximately 1,000 books that, whether previously read or not, constitute her to-be-read stack. She is a member of the National Books Critics Circle (NBCC) and Book Publicists of Southern California. You can reach her at This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it